Abstract. This paper analyzes the advantages and implications of the implementation of a European tax on carbon dioxide emissions as an own resource of the EU and it focuses on its effects on intercountry distribution. In contrast to a harmonized tax, which would only have distributive effects within each member state, a tax collected at European scale would also have important distributive effects among different countries. These effects would also depend on the use of tax revenues. The paper investigates through a simple empirical analysis the distributive effects among the member states of three tax models: a pure CO 2 model; a 50%/50% energy-CO 2 model and a CO 2 model with a burden on nuclear power.
The Debate on the Taxation of CO 2 Emissions in the European Union
At the beginning of the nineties, in the context of preparing for the Rio Earth Summit, the European Union (EU) was considering the possibility of establishing a harmonized tax on fossil fuels burdening each of them differently -according to the carbon emissions associated with their use.
The debate in the EU faced many vicissitudes. In June of 1992 the Commission presented a directive proposal (COM (92) 226 final; European Commission 1992). According to this proposal, a national harmonized tax of mixed type would be established through which the different forms of energy would be taxed according to their energy content and to the CO 2 emissions emitted in their use. In general, renewable energies would be exempt. The tax was specifically designed so that in the case of petroleum, half of the tax burden would come from its energy content and the other half from its carbon content. The tax rates were fixed so that at the moment of their application, 1993, petroleum would support a tax equivalent to $3 per barrel that would increase until reaching a value of $10 per barrel in 2000, which would be achieved with a tax of about $22 per ton of CO 2 (O'Connor 1997). Important exemptions were planned for the most energy-intensive indus-trial sectors. These types of exemptions have been a general characteristic in the introduction of energy ecotaxes in Europe and it has been wisely denounced as a factor that reduces their environmental effectiveness (Ekins and Speck 1999). The practical application of the directive was conditional to its main competitors of the OECD establishing similar tax measures.
In spite of the moderated and cautious nature of the proposal, the resolved opposition of some governments thwarted the initiative. It can be noted that when environmental policy decisions affect the tax system, the current regulation of the EU requires that they are accepted unanimously.
In May of 1995 a new directive proposal was outlined (COM (95) 172 final; European Commission 1995). Although the content of the proposal was very similar, an important modification was introduced. The directive fixed the harmonized structure of the tax, but the member states could, during a transitional period, fix the tax rates freely. The rates planned for the year 2000 -equivalent to a tax of $10 per barrel in the case of petroleum -were not obligatory, but a "target rate" on which member states would try to converge. In spite of these changes, the directive failed again because of the opposition of some governments. Even more moderate and partial proposals such as the one of March 1997 (COM (97) final; European Commission 1997), consisting of increasing the harmonized minimum rates in several phases on some energy products, was blocked until recently.
The proposals, both the one of 1992 and the one of 1995, consisted of the harmonization of minimum taxation levels, but not a tax collected at the level of the EU as an own resource. This last possibility has been practically nonexistent in the debate. However, in a European Commission report (1993) about EU revenue sources, one section is devoted to possible new own resources and the possibility of a CO 2 tax is considered. It appears, among other alternatives, as the one that fulfils more favorable criteria (Table 31 , p. 85); according to this report "there exists also a clear economic case for assigning the ensuing revenue to the supranational level of government" (p. 91).
While application of the tax at the European level is blocked, some countries have decided to apply carbon taxes (Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, and Italy), while others (Austria and Germany) have opted for increasing energy taxes. In addition to these taxes, there are other taxes that also affect energy products and the implicit tax on carbon varies a lot among the different energy products and the different EU countries (Baranzini et al. 2000) . This creates serious problems when trying to implement international coordinated taxes.
Harmonized National Taxes or International Tax?
The theoretical economic argument for a unique tax on a global problem is that it faces the problem in a more efficient way. With a unique tax the marginal costs of reducing emissions tend to equalize, thus achieving a joint reduction of emissions at a smaller total cost. Several empirical studies show that a unique
